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Putting Human Rights up Front: Implications for
Impartiality and the Politics of UN Peacekeeping
Emily Paddon Rhoads
Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, USA
ABSTRACT

This article traces the origins, development and implications of Human Rights Up
Front (HRuF), a bold and visionary initiative launched by former Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon in 2013. While HRuF is part of a broader continuum of human rightsrelated reforms, its scope and focus is distinctive. HRuF puts the imperative to
protect people from serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law at the core of the UN’s strategy and operational activities,
and obliges staﬀ to speak out about abuses and looming crises. Using the case
study of South Sudan and drawing on over 150 interviews conducted incountry, this article considers the implications of HRuF for peacekeeping and,
speciﬁcally, for impartiality, a norm traditionally regarded as the ‘lifeblood’ and
‘heart and soul’ of the UN Secretariat. I identify three challenges that have
hindered the UN’s ability to deliver impartially on its protection and human
rights mandate and the consequences thereof for the UN’s perceived
legitimacy in South Sudan. Further, I examine how the Organization has tried,
with mixed success to manage the dilemmas and tensions that have arisen
from the privileging of individual, as opposed to state or government, security,
and the implications for the broader functioning of the UN.

Introduction
The United Nations (UN) has always been involved in human rights advocacy
to some degree. Human rights are mentioned seven times in the UN Charter,
most notably in the document’s preamble. Since the institution’s founding in
1945, human rights have constituted one of its three pillars of action, along
with peace and security, and development. But it is only very recently that
human rights and human rights advocacy have been trumpeted as the institution’s overarching purpose. Indeed, for over a generation, reaﬃrming
human rights took a back seat to what was arguably the Charter’s main goal:
maintaining international peace and security, predominantly among sovereign
states, through the establishment of a framework for impartial diplomacy.1 As
CONTACT Emily Paddon Rhoads
Erhoads1@swarthmore.edu
1
See Moyn, The Last Utopia; Mazower, Governing the World.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
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a result, UN oﬃcials historically have been reluctant to use their ‘ﬁnger-pointing’ power.2 Human Rights Up Front (HRuF), a bold and visionary policy
initiative, seeks to change that.
Launched by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in late 2013, HRuF
puts the imperative to protect individuals from serious violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law at the core of the organization’s
strategy and operational activities. It obliges staﬀ to speak out ‘on an impartial
basis’ about abuses and looming crises.3 Universal human rights, the policy
contends, are ‘the basis for UN action’ and essential for ‘the sustainability
and impartiality of the Organization’s work’.4 According to Ban Ki-Moon,
the initiative oﬀers no less than ‘a once-in-a-generation opportunity to help
assure that the UN meets the aspirations of the Charter’5 and is testament to
the fact that the security of peoples is now as central as the security of states.6
What does the elevation of human rights protection as an overriding priority of the United Nations mean for peacekeeping and other core functions
of the Organization in the years ahead? What dilemmas or operational tensions might arise from this privileging of individual, as opposed to state or
government, security, and how might the UN address them? In short, is
there a downside to putting human rights up front?
This article explores these questions through an analysis of impartiality, a
norm that has long been considered the ‘lifeblood’7 of peacekeeping and ‘heart
and soul’ of the Secretariat.8 I understand impartiality as a norm in the social
constructivist sense of the word, as ‘a prescription[] for action in situations of
choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that [it] ought to be followed’.9
Impartiality is an appropriate lens through which to explore these questions
because, as a social norm, it refers not only to the position of UN oﬃcials –
that they should be unbiased and informed – but also to the values the institution seeks to project. It is a claim to authority, premised not only on a lack of
bias, but, critically, on what UN oﬃcials are supposed to represent and further
in the absence of particular interests.
Impartiality would seem at times to work at cross purposes with human
rights, particularly in contexts where one group or party commits serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The Secretariat’s reticence to
2

Exceptions include the work of the Oﬃce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which
was established by the UN General Assembly in 1993. See also, Månsson, “The forgotten agenda”.
3
United Nations, Rights Up Front.
4
United Nations, Fact Sheet—Rights up Front in the Field.
5
United Nations, Human Rights Up Front.
6
United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on Mobilizing Collective Action.
7
James, Britain and the Congo Crisis 1960-63, 211.
8
UN Chronicle, “Independence and Impartiality.” See also Paddon Rhoads, Taking Sides and the contribution by Laurence in this issue.
9
Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, 113. According to constructivists, the deontic quality of a norm
such as impartiality – its sense of ‘oughtness’ – arises from the fact that as a belief or idea individuals in a
group or community share it, to a certain degree.
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actively champion human rights during the Cold War was partly out of
concern that doing so risked the institution being perceived as partial – as
having taken sides – given that competing visions of social and political
order were precisely what the superpowers believed to be at stake. Consequently, the authority of UN oﬃcials during the Cold War was limited to
that which Member States and parties to a conﬂict conferred on them; UN
oﬃcials were passive to their demands. This has changed. As the article illuminates, since the end of the Cold War the UN has attempted to honour its
political heritage, while pursuing a more cosmopolitan interpretation of its
humanitarian responsibilities, particularly through a more ‘assertive’ understanding of impartiality.10 Claims to impartial authority – in peacekeeping
and by the Secretariat more generally – are no longer to be based on an explicit or ﬁxed notion of state consent, but on more fundamental norms as
expressed in the Charter and international humanitarian and human rights
law. The article explains how Human Rights Up Front is the latest and arguably most comprehensive attempt to reconceptualise the UN’s authority in
this way. And yet, as the analysis in this article evinces, rather than resolve
the tensions, this change gives rise to new dilemmas for the Organization
and its ability to serve as the legitimate guarantor of international peace
and security.
The article proceeds in three sections. The ﬁrst section charts the development of HRuF and shifts in the meaning of impartiality. It explicates HRuF’s
distinctiveness in terms of scope and focus, and situates the initiative within
the broader context of recent human rights-related reforms that have occasioned reinterpretations of impartiality. To understand this change and
analyse its implications, I conceive of impartiality as a composite norm and
draw on recent International Relations scholarship that emphasizes the interdependence of norms and existence of broader ‘norm complexes’.11 Rather
than being a discrete entity, impartiality, like other norms, is a complex ideational structure, composed of diﬀerent elements, each of which can change
and is open to contestation singly or in combination. I disaggregate impartiality into its procedural and substantive dimensions, elucidate the recent
change, and argue that lack of member state participation in HRuF points
to deep divisions on the substantive dimensions of the norm that may call
into question and undercut the UN’s claims to impartial authority.
Section two considers some of the potential implications of HRuF through
the case of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), where the
implementation of HRuF, and the prioritization of individual security, led to
cessation of support for the state in 2014 and a move to focus exclusively on
10

See Paddon Rhoads, Taking Sides and the contribution by Laurence in this issue.
See for example, Job and Shesterinina, “China as a Global Norm Shaper.”; Welsh, “Norm Contestation and
the Responsibility”; Paddon Rhoads, Taking Sides.
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protection in practice. As a result, some mission oﬃcials saw ﬁt to declare that
UNMISS could ‘ﬁnally be impartial’.12 Drawing on more than 150 interviews
from ﬁeld visits to South Sudan in 2013 and 2015, the vast majority of which
were conducted on background, I identify three challenges that have hindered
the UN’s ability to deliver impartially – both procedurally and substantively –
on its protection and human rights mandate and the consequences thereof for
the UN’s perceived authority and legitimacy.13 I also consider ways in which
the Organization has tried, with mixed success, to manage the dilemmas and
tensions that have arisen in South Sudan. The ﬁnal section broadens the
analysis to consider some of the implications of HRuF for the broader functioning of the United Nations.

Putting Human Rights up Front
The impetus for Human Rights up Front was the UN’s failure in early 2009 to
prevent and speak out about atrocities committed during the ﬁnal months of
Sri Lanka’s three-decade long war.14 Concerned that public criticism of the
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) would result in further restrictions on
humanitarian access, which was already severely limited, UN oﬃcials for
the most stayed silent about the widespread abuses committed by the GoSL
as it closed in on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).15 An estimated 40,000 people were killed. As the extent of the violence became clear
and criticisms of the UN began to mount, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
established an Internal Review Panel (IRP) to look into the UN’s actions
(or lack thereof). The IRP’s report, released in 2012, was unsparing and
pointed to a breakdown of leadership at almost every level. It concluded
that the events in Sri Lanka marked a ‘grave’ and ‘systemic’ failure of the
UN to adequately respond to early warnings, revealing the institution’s lack
of a ‘shared sense of responsibility for human rights violations’.16
Human Rights up Front addresses this systemic weakness and incorporates
a number of the IRP recommendations. Speciﬁcally, it aims to realize three
interconnected areas of reform.17 First, it seeks to bring about a transformation in the UN’s organizational culture such that all staﬀ and UN entities
Telephone interview with UN oﬃcial working in Juba, March 2015; Johnson, “The UN in South Sudan”.
A total of 51 interviews were conducted in Juba and Bor in 2013 by the author as well as by telephone
from New York in 2015. An additional 113 individuals were interviewed in 2015 by Rebecca Sutton, a
consultant hired to do additional ﬁeld research. Interviewees included IDP community leaders, PoC
site residents, UNMISS staﬀ, INGO staﬀ, South Sudan government oﬃcials, humanitarians, private security and members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
14
Gilmour, “The Future of Human Rights,” 240.
15
The UN’s presence in Sri Lanka was focused on development and the provision of humanitarian
assistance.
16
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel.
17
Kurtz, “With Courage and Coherence,” 4. Kurtz provides an excellent in-depth account on HRuF’s origins
and evolution. See also Gilmour, “The Future of Human Rights.”
12
13

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

285

conduct their work with awareness that individual human rights and protection of civilians are a core responsibility of the institution. It encourages staﬀ
to take a principled stance and ‘to act with moral courage to prevent serious
and large-scale violations, and pledges Headquarters’ support for those who
do so’.18 Second, it calls for operational changes to bring about this broader
cultural shift and the reprioritization of protection – what Ban Ki-Moon
described as the integration of human rights into the ‘life cycle of all
staﬀ’.19 Third, HRuF encourages staﬀ to be more proactive in their engagement with Member States with the aim of generating political support for
early and preventive action to address human rights and humanitarian crises.
To bring about these changes, the HRuF Action Plan lays out 60 measures,
many of which are focused on prevention and early warning as well as support
to UN Country Teams on the ground. In addition, HRuF has led to the creation of new institutional mechanisms. The Regional Quarterly Reviews
(RQRs), for example, bring together representatives of the UN regional divisions at headquarters to scan countries in their respective regions for early
warning signs of instability and/or protection crises and to discuss ‘evolving
situations’ that are at risk on a quarterly basis.20 For more serious situations,
the Deputy Secretary-General may convene the Senior Action Group (SAG),
which is comprised of the Principals of UN entities and seeks a ‘common
analysis, priorities and strategy’ to support a coordinated ‘whole of UN’
response to protecting individual rights.21
While the UN’s failure in Sri Lanka is what prompted the development of
HRuF, the initiative is part of a broader process of normative change that is
transforming existing international institutions – what in the 1990s began
as the ‘human security’ paradigm22 and, more recently, has been referred to
as the ‘Individualization of War’.23 In part a response to the international
community’s previous failures in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), the
realization, promotion and protection of individual rights is at the core of
this broader normative shift, which challenges the primacy of collective entities such as warring parties and sovereign states.24
18

As then Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson stated frankly:
I want UN staﬀ to know that when they stick their necks out; when they give those early warning
signals; when they show courage; they should always be recognized, even rewarded, and we will
back them up fully. This is an assurance that the Secretary-General and I give.

United Nations, HRuF: An Overview, 3.
United Nations, Aide Memoire to the Rights Up Front Plan of Action.
United Nations, HRuF: An Overview.
21
Ibid.
22
See Macfarlane and Foong Khong, Human Security and the United Nations. For a detailed study of the
evolution of related thematic resolutions, see Bode, “Reﬂective practices at the Security Council.”
23
See the European University Institute, “Individualization of War Project”; Blum, “The Individualization of
War,” 48–83; Welsh, “Humanitarian Actors and International Political Theory.” In Taking Sides, Paddon
Rhoads refers to this shift as the turn towards a more assertive liberal internationalism (71–5).
24
Welsh, “Humanitarian Actors and International Political Theory.”
19
20
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It is in this era that impartiality – an established norm of peacekeeping and
the UN Secretariat more generally – has taken on new meaning. To understand and analyse the implications of this change, I conceive of impartiality
as a composite norm. The composite norm is a heuristic tool that introduces
heterogeneity and complexity. It captures the changing meaning of impartiality at the UN and provides analytical purchase for the study of its implementation in the South Sudan case. As the empirical material evinces, rather than
simply rejecting or accepting impartiality, actors may resist or frustrate
implementation of particular elements of the norm. In what follows, I
unpack impartiality, disaggregating the composite norm into its procedural
and substantive dimensions. The discussion is conceptual and, where
applied, focuses on the work of the UN Secretariat generally with some diﬀerentiation of how impartiality ﬁgures in the context of peacekeeping more
speciﬁcally.
Unpacking Impartiality
Impartiality ﬁgures as a norm of the UN in that it prescribes how oﬃcials
within the Organization should behave: namely, that they be unbiased and
informed when making decisions or in taking action.25 This is the procedural
dimension of the norm. Like the judge or police oﬃcer, the impartial actor is
one that passes judgment and acts by setting aside particular preferences or
interests. Their decisions and actions are not to be prejudged or biased –
that is, inﬂuenced by whether they help or harm one person or group over
another. The interests of everyone count equally.
Like other institutions that value impartiality, the UN seeks to mitigate
potential biases through, for example, its personnel selection procedures,
institutional codes of conduct, and professional immunities and privileges
that allow for unimpeded access and shelter UN staﬀ from external inﬂuences
that could result in bias. In peacekeeping, such immunities and privileges, as
well as provisions for a mission’s safety, security and right of freedom of
movement, are speciﬁed in the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) which constitutes an important legal basis for a peacekeeping operation and is signed by
the host state and the UN in consultation with the troop-contributing
countries (TCCs).26
Impartiality is, however, more than its procedural dimension. As a claim to
authority, it refers not only to the position of UN oﬃcials as unbiased and
informed but also to the values the institution seeks to project and that
which UN oﬃcials are supposed to represent and further in the absence of
25

This subsection draws on the conceptualization of impartiality developed in Chapter 1 of Paddon
Rhoads, op. cit., 2016.
United Nations, A/45/594, Model Status-of-Forces Agreement, paras. 59–60.

26
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particular interests. This is captured by the second, substantive, dimension of
the norm – what Charles Taylor refers to as the ‘background of valuation’ or
foundation of values on which all impartial judgments rest explicitly or
implicitly. It is from this that the impartial actor ‘selects what is relevant to
the judgment’.27 Moreover, the substantive dimension is what diﬀerentiates
impartiality from neutrality, the concept with which it is so often confused
and conﬂated. While impartiality allows a person to be judgmental, neutrality,
by contrast, requires withholding judgment. It refers to the apolitical and nonactive character of a person’s role and thus entails negative limitations such as
the prohibition of taking a policy position. The Swiss jurist, Jean Pictet, summarized this distinction when he wrote that ‘the neutral man [sic] refuses to
make judgments whereas the one who is impartial judges a situation in
accordance with pre-established rules’.28
The substantive dimension also sets the boundaries on what can legitimately be claimed as impartial, as a subjective but authoritative interpretation.
For this to be the case, the substantive dimension must hew closely to shared
purposes and values. In other words, there must be agreement on the background of valuation. At the UN, expressions of agreement, often in the
form of Member State consent, have been essential in eﬀorts to establish
the impartial authority of oﬃcials in speciﬁc areas of engagement and
across the wider Organization. For example, as discussed below, in peacekeeping, the deployment of UN forces has historically been contingent on some
semblance of agreement amongst members of the Security Council as well
as consent for a mission and its mandate from all parties in the context of
operation.

From Passive to Assertive Impartiality
While the procedural requirements of impartiality have remained constant –
that is, the condition that UN staﬀ be unbiased and informed – the substantive
dimension has in recent years changed, leading to reinterpretations of the
norm. No longer based exclusively on terms to which all parties consent or
over which there is widespread Member State agreement, claims to impartial
authority are, instead, to be premised on a more ambitious and expansive set
of human rights-related norms, around which consensus is often assumed
given the underlying value of universality. According to UN HRuF documentation, it is the universality of human rights that provide ‘the basis for UN
action’, obligating staﬀ to speak out on ‘an impartial basis’ about abuses irrespective of who is the perpetrator.29 From acting impartially between or
Taylor, “Neutrality in the University,” 131.
Pictet, The Fundamental Principles, 3.
United Nations, Fact Sheet—Rights Up Front in the Field.

27
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among states, the authority of UN oﬃcials has transformed into claiming
authority over parties based on a more expansive background of valuation
that concerns itself ﬁrst and foremost with human rights. Thus, even
though the Organization usually operates with a degree of state consent, it
now frequently ﬁnds itself squaring oﬀ against governments.
In peacekeeping, where impartiality still remains a core norm, UN
forces are now regularly charged with protecting civilians and are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, making government consent
for the use of force formally unnecessary.30 The PoC mandate, as Mona
Khalil, former Senior Legal Oﬃcer with the UN Oﬃce of the Legal
Counsel, explains ‘requires UNPKOs to act independently when the host
Government is unable or unwilling, and even to take action against the
host Government forces where and when they pose a threat to civilians’.31
This is a marked contrast to Cold War missions in which peacekeepers
were ‘passively impartial’ – tasked with observing frontiers and ceaseﬁre
agreements based on terms directly consented to by those parties in
dispute. Indeed, were political consensus in the Council to deteriorate, a
ceaseﬁre agreement to disintegrate or consent for a mission be withdrawn,
as was the case in 1967 with UNEF, peacekeepers had little recourse to
defend their mandate.32 No longer commensurate with the impartial
mediator whose judgments are based on terms set by those parties consenting to mediation, the role prescribed for blue helmets today is more
akin to police oﬃcers that impartially enforce the law and ‘penalise
infractions’.33
We see similar changes in other areas of international engagement. For
example, in the ﬁeld of international criminal accountability, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with its universal jurisdiction is unprecedented in its
claim to impartially investigate and try alleged perpetrators of international
crimes regardless of whether their states have given consent to the organization by ratifying the Rome Statute. The Court may, for instance, prosecute
nationals of states not party to the Statute if they have committed international crimes on the territory or against nationals of states party to the
Statute. In addition, the Security Council may, acting under Chapter VII,
refer a situation in which crimes appear to have been committed to the
ICC prosecutor.34

30

Today, over ninety-ﬁve percent of UN forces operating under the aegis of DPKO are explicitly mandated
under Chapter VII to protect civilians at risk of imminent harm.
31
Khalil, “Why are UN Peacekeepers Failing to Protect Civilians?”.
32
Burns, “The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping.”
33
United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
34
According to the Statute, the conduct of all proceedings must be impartial, and agents of the Court,
including judges and the prosecutor, must take a solemn oath to exercise their duties impartially.
See Articles 17, 20, 36, 41, 42, 45, 64, 67 and 68 of the Rome Statute (1998).
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Reform without Consensus
HRuF is part of this broader continuum. However, it is diﬀerent from previous UN human-rights related reforms and initiatives. Developed by and
for UN staﬀ, it is distinctive in its internal focus and application to all UN
staﬀ in all countries and all situations. Relatedly, the initiative is unique in
terms of the absence of sustained Member State and civil society involvement.
While a group of Member States expressed their strong support for HRuF, the
initiative was developed under the auspices of an interagency working group
set up by Ban Ki-Moon and comprised of UN entities relevant to protection
and human rights.35 After the group formulated the ‘Rights Up Front Action
Plan’, the Secretary-General in November 2013 issued a statement to all UN
staﬀ outlining the plan. The following month, Deputy Secretary-General Jan
Eliasson briefed Member States on the reform eﬀorts underway within the
organization and informed the press.
The development and implementation of HRuF was based on a deliberate
strategy that change, as Kurtz explains, ‘would take place ﬁrst within the UN
system, below the level at which member state approval is required’.36 Consequently, the launch was intentionally done ‘softly’ without much fanfare, as
Andrew Gilmour, now Assistant Secretary-General on Human Rights
explains; little detail on the substance of the initiative was provided beyond
general description. According to Gilmour, there was a desire on the part
of the Secretariat to ‘get on with implementing the intended reforms …
without making a public fuss’.37 UN oﬃcials were concerned that too much
public attention surrounding the action plan could provoke a serious backlash
from states wary of an intrusive and activist organization, and the possible
erosion of sovereignty.
The concerns of the Secretariat are well founded. Over the past decade,
various human rights-related initiatives at the UN have been vehemently contested with Member States frustrating eﬀorts at implementation. For example,
despite the unanimous endorsement in 2005 of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), annual debates on R2P in the General Assembly
reveal lingering contestation about some of its prescriptions (particularly
those involving coercive measures), and divisions on the Security Council
have meant that grave atrocities in Syria and Myanmar have gone unanswered
in recent years.38 Similarly, in Sri Lanka, it was not solely UN staﬀ that failed
to protect. As the crisis worsened, serious consideration of the situation by the
Council was scuppered by China and its ties to the GoSL as well as by India
Kurtz, “With Courage and Coherence.”
Ibid., 14.
37
Gilmour, “The Future of Human Rights,” 244.
38
Welsh, “The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria,” 75–87; Welsh, “Norm Contestation and the
Responsibility,” 365–96.
35
36
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and Pakistan’s opposition to external interference in the region. In the area of
peacekeeping, some of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCCs) take
issue with the ambitious and risky protection mandates authorized by the
Council. They worry about the implications for sovereignty, particularly when
the state or elements of the state are implicated in the violence, and they object
to what they see as an unequal system of burden sharing in peacekeeping.39
One could argue that the HRuF initiative did not require active Member
State involvement given that it was an internal reform process, a response
to the UN’s failures in Sri Lanka. However, the changes that HRuF seeks to
bring about are broader than that. It shifts the UN’s overarching purpose
with profound implications for the relationship between UN oﬃcials and
Member States. Consequently, the lack of buy-in on the substantive dimension of the norm from some of the Organization’s constituent members
raises diﬃcult questions about the UN’s ability to act and be accepted as an
impartial authority in calling out and holding Member States to account for
human rights violations.
The following section examines some of the challenges encountered in the
area of peacekeeping and, speciﬁcally, in the case of the United Nations
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). HRuF applies to all UN staﬀ in all
countries and all situations. Nonetheless, analysis of how it has been
implemented in peacekeeping practice is illuminating given the prominence
of and priority given to human rights and protection in most contemporary
mission mandates.40

Putting Human Rights up Front in South Sudan
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) began with high
hopes following the country’s independence in 2011. Whatever optimism
may have existed was dashed in December 2013 when war broke out. The
roots of the crisis lay in a power struggle between President Kiir and
former Vice President Riek Machar with political elites fomenting chaos by
appealing to ethnic divides. ‘They put a knife into what bound us’, rails an
IDP in Juba: ‘turned the crisis from political to ethnic’.41 The violence was
by all accounts extreme and brutal with widespread violations of humanitarian and human rights law by all sides.
The state’s role as one of the main perpetrators of violence directed at civilians thrust the UN into a precarious situation vis-à-vis the government, one
Bellamy and Williams, “The New Politics of Protection?”; Cunliﬀe, Legions of Peace; Paddon Rhoads,
Taking Sides.
Non-mission contexts are those in which UN agencies are present as a result of bilateral negotiation with
a government rather than authorization through an intergovernmental process in the Security Council or
Peacebuilding Commission.
41
African Union, Draft Report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 4.
39
40
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that was not wholly dissimilar to Sri Lanka. While the mission had operated
with host government consent during its initial two years of deployment, the
outbreak of war brought the tension between individual human rights and
state sovereignty to the fore and called into question the sources of UN authority and whether it must be based on explicit consent. The UN’s response to
this conﬂict of values has been largely reactive and ad hoc. Faced with an
immediate crisis, the UN prioritized the short-term goal of ‘saving’ peoples,
driven by an ethic of individualization. However, as evinced by the analysis
below, this has made the Organization’s ability to be impartial – both in
terms of the procedural and substantive dimensions of the norm – very
diﬃcult and has raised issues regarding the kind and quality of protection
that is really being provided.
For example, when tens of thousands of civilians ﬂeeing for their lives
turned up and banged on the gates of UN bases, in several places scaling perimeter fences to gain entry, peacekeepers responded by making space within
their compounds – a response that few imagined would eventually lead to the
presence of over 200,000 IDPs on UN bases across the country.42 The institution was widely praised for its actions. ‘The opening of the gates’, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon exclaimed, was a ‘landmark step in the United
Nations’ eﬀorts to protect people caught up in conﬂict’ and precisely the
kind of bold action envisioned under HRuF.43 Some oﬃcials even went so
far as to wager that the actions of UNMISS constituted ‘the single most successful measure ever taken by the UN to directly protect the lives and human
rights of civilians’.44 While HRuF was not directly responsible for the mission’s actions or policy, oﬃcials assert that it provided ‘conceptual cover’
and ‘institutional backing’ for decisions related to the PoC sites.45
The Security Council, for its part, responded to the crisis by reconﬁguring
the mission and equipping UNMISS with one of the strongest protection and
human rights mandates in peacekeeping history. Resolution 2155 of May
2014 attempted to resolve the tension between individual human rights and
host government consent by stripping UNMISS of its state-building and
peace-building functions. The Council’s message was clear: the UN would
not support a government that was perpetrating widespread human rights
abuses against its own population. Under Resolution 2155, PoC became the
mission’s focus along with monitoring and investigating human rights
abuses, creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and supporting the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement.46 UNMISS was instructed by the Security Council to ‘observe complete
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impartiality towards all of the country’s parties and communities’.47 Given
the absence of direct support to the government under the new mandate,
many on the ground believed this to be possible; the UN ‘can ﬁnally be
impartial’, exclaimed one UN oﬃcial.48 To support and strengthen the
UN’s response and ensure the necessary staﬃng of human rights personnel,
a HRuF Senior Action Group on South Sudan was established at UN
headquarters.
Protection and human rights have remained the focus of UNMISS’
mandate since 2014, notwithstanding revisions to include the Security Council’s request that the mission support implementation of the 2015 Agreement
on the Resolution of the Conﬂict in South Sudan (ARCSS).49 And yet, despite
this focus, UNMISS has struggled greatly. In particular, the mission has confronted three sets of challenges that have greatly hindered its ability to
implement its mandate and act with ‘complete impartiality’.
Consent, Access and Information
We are supposed to go wherever we want, but the government keeps preventing
us. They will probably just let us go where we want once they’ve ﬁnished killing
everyone oﬀ. (UN oﬃcial, Juba, 2015)

While the mission’s relationship with the Government was difﬁcult since its
deployment in 2011, these tensions paled in comparison to the stalemate
that arose in the period following the outbreak of war and which greatly
impeded the UN’s ability to be impartial. The repurposing of UNMISS in
2014 antagonized the government. As the mission’s focus shifted entirely to
protection, the government increasingly came to view the UN as an ‘adversary’.50 The mono-ethnic make-up of the PoC sites played a part in fuelling
such tensions. With the exception of the Malakal site, which is mixed, the
vast majority of site residents are Nuer, the ethnic group of Riek Machar,
former vice president and current commander of the opposition. Consequently, at various junctures, the government frequently condemned these
sites as ‘opposition’ strongholds and ‘rebel’ havens,51 and accused UNMISS
of ‘taking sides’.52 UN ofﬁcials have been harassed, assaulted, attacked and
detained by elements of the government. In sum, the UN’s attempt to
resolve the tension between human rights protection and cooperation with
the host state has led to further dilemmas and a number of unintended
consequences.
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In particular, the UN’s principled stance has had implications for its operational eﬀectiveness and its ability to uphold the procedural dimensions of
impartiality – that is, the conditions of being unbiased and informed. Restrictions on access, an issue since the mission’s inception, have worsened considerably since 2014. In particular, the Government of South Sudan has
frustrated the mission’s freedom of movement, denying UN oﬃcials access
to huge swaths of the country and thus critical information. Restrictions on
ﬂights have been particularly debilitating given that much of the country, particularly during the rainy season, is inaccessible by road. Following the shooting down of UN helicopters in both 2012 and 2014, those countries operating
UN aircraft requested security guarantees. Since then the mission has been
required to obtain Flight Safety Assurances (FSAs) from both the government
and opposition before any ﬂight. On the ground the mission’s access has been
disrupted by the prevalent use of checkpoints. In May 2017, it was reported
that military checkpoints were blocking aid workers from reaching two
famine-stricken areas.53
Faced with government intransigence, mission oﬃcials have at times been
wary of calling out the government for SoFA violations due to concerns that it
might further strain their relationship and limit access. Following the authorization of Resolution 2155, UN oﬃcials describe how considerable eﬀort was
made to foster a ‘good relationship with the government’.54 One oﬃcial noted
that, at various points, senior oﬃcials ‘bent over backwards to accommodate
the government’; in meetings they were quick to ‘downplay the restrictions
imposed by the Security Council in New York that forbid supporting the
state’.55 These eﬀorts, however, have failed to improve relations and arguably
have come at the expense of human rights protections. SoFA violations have
increased and continue to hamper the mission’s ability to rapidly respond to
protection threats. In 2016, for example, the Panel of Experts on South Sudan
reported in one three-month period a staggering 50 SoFA violations committed by the SPLA and government.56
Without suﬃcient knowledge and information of what is going on in particular areas, the mission has struggled to impartially uphold its protection
mandate and meet the procedural requirements of the norm. Obstructions
by the government have scuppered the UN’s operational plans and prevented
the mission from responding to protection threats and attacks against civilians, exacerbating perceptions that the UN is partial. What is more, lack of
access has impeded the collection of information and data necessary to
make impartial judgments. As a result, human rights reporting has been
53
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limited, particularly since the onset of the civil war. Beyond the gaze of
UNMISS, the parties continue to commit widespread human rights violations
and atrocities against civilians in furtherance of their strategic aims.
Force Protection and Political Will
[We] were forced to come here for protection but you get another kind of insecurity here. (South Sudanese male, Bentiu PoC site, 2015)

While the PoC sites have provided a modicum of security from external
threats, the mission has struggled to maintain the safety and security of the
sites. Furthermore, the sites have created a whole host of new protection
issues. Crime within and around UN bases is rife. Sexual violence is
rampant. In a survey conducted by the UN in 2016, 70 percent of women
in the sites said they had been raped since December 2013 and 78 percent
reported being forced to watch someone else being sexually violated.57
Access to justice is also limited.58 What is more, peacekeepers have failed to
use force to respond to civilians when they are at risk of imminent attack
or come under attack inside the PoC sites. Since the outbreak of the war,
the PoC sites have been overrun or shelled on four separate occasions, resulting in over 180 IDPs deaths.59
Overstretched and under-resourced, UN forces have largely ignored protection threats outside the sites in a country where over a quarter of the population is now displaced. In July 2016, when a standoﬀ between Kiir and
Machar once again consumed the capital in unrestrained violence, UN
forces stationed in Juba did little to halt the violence that killed a total of 73
people, including 20 individuals that were located at the PoC sites. The presence of peacekeepers outside the bases was described as ‘non-existent’ despite
orders from the UN command that it intervene.60 A UN internal investigation
highlighted one particularly egregious incident in which government troops
attacked a refugee camp one kilometre away from UNMISS headquarters
and committed horriﬁc abuses. Those in the camps made multiple requests
for peacekeepers to be sent. Each time the requests were denied.61 The
same report found that in the months after the attack UNMISS forces continued to be reluctant to venture outside the PoC sites.
Past attempts to expand the mission’s reach and visibility with patrols and
community visits, however, suggest that protection beyond the sites may at
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times come with considerable risks and unintended consequences for those
the mission is mandated to protect. Given that the government must be consulted for access, there is considerable risk that its knowledge of UNMISS’
whereabouts may further imperil civilians, particularly those in hiding. As
one oﬃcial explains: ‘there was an incident in Myandeet where the UN
went and followed people to the bush to protect them, but this signalled
where the civilians were and put them at risk. SPLA has been targeting civilians and civilian resources’.
The reluctance of peacekeepers to move beyond bases has also had negative
implications for humanitarians who lament that it has hindered their own
access to civilians. What is more, humanitarians have also made repeated
calls to the UN in moments of crisis to which peacekeepers have failed to
respond. During the July 2016 crisis, international aid workers were sexually
abused, raped and gang-raped by government soldiers who stormed their
compound, which was located several hundred metres away from a UN
base. No response was mounted by peacekeepers, despite numerous appeals
by the aid workers for the UN to send help.62
The lack of force protection by peacekeepers is not new nor is it speciﬁc to
this mission context. In 2014, a critical internal UN review of eight active
peacekeeping missions uncovered a ‘persistent pattern’ of peacekeeper passivity in which ‘force was almost never used’ to protect civilians.63 The reasons
for peacekeeper passivity are varied. It reﬂects diﬀerent and conﬂicting views
about the mandate, abilities to take action, and what many regard as an
inherent unwillingness to assume the risks associated with the use of force.
In this respect, the failure of peacekeepers to implement the more assertive
conception of impartiality at the ﬁeld level is inextricably linked to the substantive objections that these same states raise at headquarters about robust
peacekeeping and its implications for sovereignty.
Peacekeepers also argue that they are ill equipped and outnumbered for
the job. In South Sudan, the mission has had chronic diﬃculties in projecting force in part because it lacks the necessary hardware. Numerous
attempts to import military helicopters and unmanned, unarmed aerial
vehicles have been blocked by the government, and new troop deployments
have been painfully slow. The absence of adequate emergency medical services has also contributed to peacekeeper passivity, as Matt Wells explains:
‘UNMISS troops are asked to put themselves in harm’s way without assurances that, should they be wounded, they will receive prompt care’. Wells
recounts how
when Chinese peacekeepers were hit by an RPG during the July ﬁghting in Juba,
there was no surgical team or blood bank on site at the Mission’s biggest base.
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UNMISS was neither able to secure SPLA support for evacuation, nor willing to
transport the casualties without that approval.64

Two peacekeepers died as a result.
As in other contexts, the absence of a strong and uniﬁed Security Council
backing for the mission has contributed to the mission’s weak-kneed
approach despite authorization of a robust human rights mandate. Since
the outbreak of the war, the Council has increasingly been divided in its
approach to South Sudan as evinced by Member State abstentions on
Council resolutions.65 Lack of unity within the Council also explains the
Council’s failure to deliver on its threat of sanctions as well as the absence
of an arms embargo despite the parties on-going use of heavy weapons
against civilians. Such failures have undermined UNMISS’ ability to be assertively impartial and, as critics argue, they have ‘weakened the Mission and
peacekeeping as an institution’.66

Political Engagement and Leverage
UNMISS’ more restricted mandate, which has engendered perceptions that
the mission is partial and diminished its access, has in turn aﬀected the
UN’s ability to act and be accepted as a political arbiter. The mission’s
inﬂuence and political leverage over the government has decreased considerably since the outbreak of the war and repurposing of the mission to focus on
protection and human rights. Indeed, the UN has been marginalized from the
very political processes that many experts argue are the only path to lasting
peace and human rights protection in South Sudan. ‘The mission’ as one
oﬃcial laments ‘is at the bottom of the political food chain’.67
In 2014, UNMISS was excluded from peace talks between the Government
of South Sudan and SPLM-in-Opposition, mediated by the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD). This resulted, as experts note, in an
unusual situation in which ‘mediators sought to facilitate a ceaseﬁre
without the involvement of the UN mission that would logically be the implementing partner, especially for monitoring and civilian protection provisions’.68 The mission’s role in the peace process did not fare much better
under ‘IGAD Plus’, which launched the following year and consisted of a
broad coalition of international actors including IGAD, the UN, AU, ﬁve
African countries, the Troika (the US, UK and Norway), EU and China.
Speaking to the press, Moustapha Soumare, Deputy Special Representative
Wells, “The Mixed Record of UN Peacekeeping,” 14.
Resolution 2252 (2015) was passed with abstentions from Russia and Venezuela. Resolution 2304 (2016)
was passed with abstentions from Russia, China, Venezuela and Egypt.
66
Wells, “The Mixed Record of UN Peacekeeping,” 14.
67
Quoted in Sharland and Gorur, Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan, 19.
68
World Peace Foundation, “UNMISS short mission brief.”
64
65

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

297

of UNMISS, explained that the mission’s participation was limited given its
focus on protection and absence of a Security Council mandate that would
enable it to be ‘fully part of [the process]’.69
UNMISS was similarly left out of consultations in 2016 that led to the
creation of a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force (RPF) by Security
Council Resolution 2304. Developed by IGAD and other regional states,
the RPF was conceived as a response to the July 2016 crisis. Similar to
the Force Intervention Brigade, which was deployed in 2013 as part of
MONUSCO following the fall of Goma, the RPF is conceived as a specialized standalone unit within the larger UNMISS structure.70 It is tasked with
providing a secure environment in and around Juba. Like the FIB, it too
was authorized from a position of weakness, an admission of the UN’s
inability to deliver on its mandate and the primacy of regional actors.
UNMISS oﬃcials criticized IGAD and the Council for failing to consult
with the mission during the development of the RPF, particularly given
their overlapping mandates and the risks of politicization given the military
involvement of regional actors.71 What is more, UN staﬀ as well as humanitarians remain deeply sceptical about the ability of the new force to make
much of a diﬀerence in terms of protection, noting that the challenges faced
by UNMISS persist.72

Conclusion
While it remains to be seen how HRuF will fare under the leadership of
António Guterres, the UN’s new Secretary-General, the issues raised by
HRuF are nonetheless worthy of serious consideration given that the initiative, as this article has argued, is the latest development in a series of UN
human-rights related reforms that are part of an ongoing and broader
process of normative change – what some scholars have referred to as the
‘Individualization of War’. The claims to assertive impartiality that underpin
this speciﬁc initiative and which manifest in other areas of individualization
have a certain intuitive appeal. They seek to move beyond sovereign
borders to the well-being of individuals living within them. For those
working at the hard edge of human misery, they oﬀer seemingly straightforward accounts of right and wrong. They diﬀerentiate victim from aggressor,
they assign innocence and guilt, and they compel action. All of this makes
them diﬃcult to argue with. That the UN should speak out against, and
hold to account, those responsible for serious violations of human rights
seems a notion that is unquestionably worthy. But claims to impartiality
Radio Tamazuj, “UNMISS Admits.”
For an analysis of the FIB, see Laurence’s article in this issue.
71
Spink, Challenges and Conditions for Deploying an Eﬀective RPF.
72
Ibid.
69
70

298

E. PADDON RHOADS

must be considered as only that – claims. Far from being universal or absolute,
impartial judgments are socially bound as this article has argued. Their validity is contingent on there being agreement on the substantive dimension,
on human rights and protection as the basis for judgment.
The consequences of the UN claiming this type of authority in the absence
of deep commitment by Member States are, as evinced by the case of UNMISS
in South Sudan, very real. They come with the risk of politicization and normative overreach, and they raise pressing questions about the UN’s future role
and its ability to act as the legitimate guarantor of international peace and
security. As scholars have argued, the legitimacy of the UN – and by extension
the likelihood of its securing the resources and access so critical to its operations – derives not just from its practical eﬀectiveness, but from whether it
is seen to reﬂect and promote shared values.73 In South Sudan, the mission’s
prioritization of protection and human rights as an immediate response to
suﬀering has meant that the UN is excluded from the very political processes
that may be the best hope for civilian protection in the long-term.
In a time of political fragmentation, where the liberal international order
itself is in jeopardy, these risks are all the graver, and the need for the UN
to maintain and extend its good oﬃces and mediator role is all the greater.
This is not to say that human rights should be abandoned or that they do
not have a place within the UN. They can, are and should be part of the
UN’s engagement in the world. What is arguably needed is a more a
nimble and pragmatic UN approach to human rights, one that recognizes
the potential trade-oﬀs, perils and pitfalls of putting them ‘up front’.
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